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Summary 
 
The UK has paid a heavy economic price for three decades of anti -union policy 
and law. If the recovery from the recession is to be placed on a secure footing, the 
status of trade unions as an essential part of sound economic policymaking must 
be restored.  
The share of wages in national income has declined across the developed world over 
the last thirty years. At the same time, and despite political rhetoric, growth in wage rates is 
significantly down on the levels achieved in the post-war period. For the UK, the boost 
provided by extraordinary levels of household debt created in the 2000s, and the consumption 
it fuelled, collapsed spectacularly during the financial crisis of 2008. 
These two facts are associated. Although wages are treated purely as a cost for 
businesses in conventional economics, where reductions in wages imply greater profits, and 
therefore more growth, this is only part of the story. Wages and salaries paid to employees are 
not simply a cost to businesses. They are also the means by which consumers buy products. If 
wages fall as share of income, it implies a shrinking of the market. The result is a drag on 
profits and growth. 
 
The UK is a wage-led economy 
 
Our research shows that, for nearly all European countries, including the UK, growth is ‘wage-
led’. This means that the boost to demand from rising wages outweighs other impacts on profits 
and international competitiveness; growth in national income is driven by growing wages more 
than by growing company profits.  
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For every 1% reduction in the share of national income going to wages, UK national income – 
measured by GDP – is reduced by 0.13%, or £2.21bn at current values. Wage share has declined 
from its 1975 peak of 76% to an historic low of 67% today; this has had a direct impact on 
national income. 
 
Decline in union density has slowed economic development  
 
The slide in the wage share is the outcome of deliberate government policy, enacted more 
forcefully in the UK than in much of Europe, to reshape labour market institutions. Trade 
unions have been legally curtailed and unionisation has declined from a peak of nearly half the 
workforce (49.9%) in 1981, to its low point today (25%).  
The slide in union authority, as indicated in falling density, has driven the falling wage 
share. The literature suggests that this fall in union density is of far greater impact than ‘skill-
biased’ technological change or globalisation in explaining the decline in wage share. 
Declining union presence has, as a result, fed directly into lower growth overall. The 
evidence we present suggests that the decline in union density, from its peak in 1975 to today, 
has reduced UK GDP by up to 1.6% – a significant and permanent loss. Restoring union density 
to the levels seen in the early 1980s would, thanks to the impact on the wage share, add up to 
£27.2bn to current UK GDP. 
The bias of policy for many years has therefore been mistaken, implicitly assuming the 
UK to be a profit-led economy. Far from boosting growth, and therefore promoting a ‘trickle 
down’ effect, it has both worsened inequality by squeezing the wage share, and at the same 
time hampered overall economic development – a clear lose–lose. Restoring the wage share, 
in a wage-led economy like the UK’s, is a win–win: improving both equality and development. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents robust econometric evidence on the positive impact of trade 
unions and collective bargaining on economic growth. Contrary to the assumptions 
embedded in the increasingly restrictive legal regime governing trade union 
activity, now to be tightened further under proposals made in the Queen's Speech 
2015, responsible trade unionism can boost economic growth and reverse widening 
inequality: a win–win for both efficiency and social justice, usually considered 
rare in economics. 
Building on previous econometric work on ‘wage-led growth’, the evidence presented 
here demonstrates that for a range of European countries, including the UK, an increasing trade 
union presence ensures that a greater share of economic output is distributed to the labour force. 
This is against the strong assumptions of economic policymaking across the continent, which 
has favoured (or at least turned a blind eye to) a rising share of income going to the owners of 
capital as the necessary complement of encouraging entrepreneurship, investment and 
innovation. The ‘trickle down’ effect was supposed to ensure that, even if inequality rose, all 
would be better off as a result. 
‘Neoliberal’ policies along these lines have significantly reduced trade union authority 
in both workplaces and wider society – decisively so in the case of the UK. Weakened trade 
unions have, in turn, reinforced the shift in the distribution of income towards those who own 
capital, rather than the workforce, over and above the widely-reported impact of ‘skill-biased’ 
technological change. A survey of the evidence on the latter, presented here, suggest that the 
impact of technological change on the wage share is far less clear than conventionally 
presented. It has been changes in the structure of the labour market, and in particular the steady 
decline of trade union bargaining power, that has had the more substantial impact across the 
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continent. But, regardless of causes, as the macroeconomic analysis presented in this paper 
indicates, the shift away from wages and salaries in national income has come at a cost not 
only in terms of fairness or other social concerns, but directly in economic outcomes. 
The logic is simple: wages and salaries have a dual role. As well as posing a cost to 
businesses, wages paid to labour also provide a market demand for output, hence higher 
consumption. Recognising that rising wages produce larger markets can also lead to increased 
investment (and therefore economic growth) by businesses. The balance of the cost of rising 
wages against the expanding market offered by rising wages will determine the character of 
economic growth in any given economy – ‘profit-led’, in which costs dominate, or ‘wage-led’, 
in which the market effect dominates. 
The evidence presented here shows that European economies in general, and the UK in 
particular, are wage-led. Policies, as in recent practice, that reduce the share of income going 
to wages imply as a result an economy-wide cost in lost growth and output. In a wage-led 
economy, a declining share of wages leads in turn to a reduced rate of economic growth. 
Society becomes both more unequal and, disturbingly, less efficient. Far from securing more 
rapid rates of growth, neoliberal policy in Europe has produced a distinct cost. 
We estimate that the loss of output from a falling wage share in the UK is significant. 
For every 1% increase in the share of profits in national income, GDP is reduced by 0.13%, or 
£2.21bn at the UK's current GDP. Any positive effects from a greater transfer of resources to 
the owners of capital, appearing as both an insignificant impact on investment and a mild 
impact on foreign exports, are more than offset by the fall in consumption expenditure. The 
decline in the wage share of national income in the UK, from a peak of 76% in 1975 to 67% in 
2014, has, we suggest, reduced overall economic growth. And it has been the slide in union 
authority, best seen through the slide in union density, which accounts for that slide in the wage 
share by up to 9.3% according to our estimates. 
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Placing this together, we estimate that for the UK the decline in unionisation (as represented 
by union density) has reduced UK GDP by up to 1.6% over three decades – a significant and 
permanent loss of output. Alternatively, if union density were to recover to the levels seen in 
the early 1980s, with close to half the workforce in the unions, GDP would be 1.6% higher, or 
£27.2bn at current levels. This would be a significant, and permanent, net gain. 
In other words, the ongoing bias of policy towards restricting trade union rights, at least 
partly motivated by the intention to deliver higher economic growth, is profoundly ill-
conceived. To boost growth and reduce inequality, policy must instead focus on supporting and 
sustaining responsible trade unionism. Partly, government can set a direct lead on this, 
removing the 1% cap on pay increases in the public sector and restoring collective bargaining 
where it has been undermined. More generally, the severe legal restrictions placed on trade 
unions in the UK have most likely had a detrimental impact on economic growth. Derestricting 
union activities, most notably in allowing them a greater capacity to organise and act in defence 
of their members, would help promote union membership and therefore have a positive impact 
on economic growth.  
Overall, the evidence here shows that the bias of policy (and the political narrative) 
against unionism and restrictions on union activity cannot be justified in any economic terms. 
The UK has, collectively, paid a heavy price for three decades of anti-union policy and law. If 
the recovery from the recession is to be placed on a secure footing, the status of trade unions 
as an essential and desirable part of sound economic policymaking must be restored. 
 
Reading this report 
 
The data presented in Chapter 1 shows the dual trends, of a significant decline in the share of 
national income going to wages and declining strength of collective voice, that have 
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characterised the past four decades. We cover how and why the bargaining power of employees 
has reduced significantly across Europe in recent years, with the UK leading the trend, and 
present the empirical evidence that this decline in membership and efficacy is related to a 
declining labour share of income.  
In Chapter 2 we consider what negative impact this has had on economic prosperity, 
laying out the evidence that strong collective bargaining structures make for more robust 
economies. Chapter 3 provides policy proposals from seven UK trade unions aimed at 
reversing the negative economic impact that restrictions on the bargaining power of workers 
have had. 
Chapter 1: The value of collective voice in the workplace 
 
The labour market in the UK has become increasingly characterised by a falling 
wage share, stagnating median wages,  growth in low-paid, precarious work and 
runaway top to bottom pay ratios. Behind these trends has been a decisive shift of 
power in favour of employers in determining employment terms, as unionisation, 
fair-wage and collective bargaining structures have been seriously undermined.1  
 
Wages are determined in a bargaining process that starts with the most fundamental elements 
of the economy: the ability of those who own capital to buy labour. Over time, bargaining 
structures have developed to negotiate the interests of the labour force with their employers. 
For the UK, like other European countries, the main institutions that negotiate from the 
standpoint of the labour force are trade unions.  
As we show in this chapter, trade unions have been consistently undermined over the 
last three decades, right across Europe. The predominant economic argument provided for the 
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anti-union policies and labour market deregulation that have characterised this undermining is 
that despite a loss of their bargaining power, workers overall will gain from economies that are 
better able to produce profits and therefore faster growth. The findings of our research counter 
this claim.  
To begin, we here take a look at the ways in which, despite very different histories, a 
common European drive to reduce union power has set in. We address dominant arguments 
presented for the decline in the wage share, and make the case that – whatever impact 
technological change may have had – it is the decline in unions’ bargaining power over wages 
that has been decisive.  
 
1.1 Less money for more work 
The decades since the 1970s have seen a significant shift in the distribution of the national 
incomes of developed economies. Regardless of their specific histories and institutions, 
European countries have seen a pronounced decline in the share of national income received 
by labour – the ‘wage share’ – and a corresponding increase in the share going to capital in the 
form of profits of private business owners, shareholders and financial investors – the ‘profit 
share’. 
Figure 1 illustrates the wage share for selected EU countries since the 1960s. Despite 
significant differences in the industrial relations and welfare regimes of these countries, a clear 
decline in the wage share from the 1980s onwards is a common feature in all of them.  
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Figure 1: Adjusted wage share, %2
 
Source: AMECO3 
Note: ‘EU15’ shows an average of wage share decline in 15 European Union Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.4  
 
For the UK, the wage share reached its peak in 1975 at 76.2% and by 2014 had decreased by 
8.9%, to 67.3%. This decline is a trend in the advanced countries such as Germany and Sweden, 
as is shown in the graph, but also in many developing economies, for example in India, South 
Africa and Mexico.5 Over the period 2000 to 2008 the share of wages declined in 58% of what 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) categorises as the ‘emerging economies’ such as 
Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey, as well as in 53% of low- and middle-income 
countries and 60% of the least developed countries.6 
This declining wage share has arrived alongside a pronounced increase in the inequality 
of wealth and income, with a particularly dramatic increase in the share of both the top 1% and 
0.1% of income earners. Since wage income is generally more equally distributed than income 
from profits, many scholars have argued that there is a causal relationship between the two 
trends – meaning that society has become more unequal specifically because the share of 
national income going to wages has decreased.7 The UK has seen a particularly sharp divide in 
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the way the declining wage share has impacted more and less well-paid workers. Most of the 
fall in the wage share has been borne by those earning average wages and below, while earnings 
for those at the very top have raced away. This means that people on average and low wages 
have effectively been hit twice, having access to a shrinking slice of a progressively smaller 
wage pie.8 
[BOX 1: Including the income of the self-employed in the wage share  
Income generated by self-employed workers makes up an important part of the wage 
share. Difficulties in accurately measuring the income of this group, however, often 
lead to it being based on overly simplistic assumptions, or left out of calculations.  
With the proportion of self-employed workers within the UK labour force increasing, 
it is ever more important to include their labour income in measures. We have therefore 
calculated the wage share as the total share of GDP that goes to labour compensation, 
adjusted to include a labour compensation for each self-employed person equivalent to 
the average compensation of dependent employees. This methodology is used by a 
number of official databases, including that of the European Commission and OECD.9 
BOX END] 
 
1.2 Why has the wage share fallen? 
Such a stark change, occurring across different countries simultaneously, has naturally attracted 
scholarly attention. The remainder of this chapter presents an explanation of the fall in the wage 
share that focuses on the role that bargaining institutions play in determining how any economy 
distributes its output.  
A conventional approach to the ‘functional income distribution’ (the division of an 
economy’s output between labour and capital) would conclude that as labour is paid according 
to its productivity, wages fall when the workforce become less productive. This is generally 
known as the ‘neoclassical’ approach. What this approach does not fully account for is how 
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wage levels are affected by the relationship between employees and their employers. Here we 
argue instead that, while factors such as productivity have an impact on the remuneration of 
workers, wages are principally determined by the relative bargaining power of workers and 
employers. As the labour market is not a passive instrument that allocates rewards on the basis 
of contributions (as the neoclassical approach assumes), wages are not automatically 
determined by the level of input of employees. The labour market is a complex, social 
institution made up of people, and as such is open to many influences. 
Further to this, taking into account the influences on the labour market, our approach 
to the declining wage share acknowledges that the determinants of the bargaining power of 
both employees and employers are multidimensional. The capacities of both parties to negotiate 
wages are influenced by market conditions, the coverage of labour market institutions such as 
trade unions, and the legal and political context in which bargaining operates.10 We explore the 
implications of looking at the bargaining power of labour as a key determinant of the decreasing 
wage share, alongside alternative explanations for the decline, in the sections that follow.  
 
1.3 The role of unions in maintaining the wage share 
European societies have evolved, over many years, similar institutions to help regulate the 
labour market. Although the form and extent varies across countries, these institutions have 
historically acted as the primary route through which labour expresses its collective voice. This 
institutional role of trade unions in bargaining for labour has been critical and has developed 
alongside capitalism as a vehicle for setting wages. In recent years, however, there has been a 
pronounced decline in membership of unions and in the share of the workforce covered by 
collective bargaining.  
There are a number of factors to consider when establishing a picture of the bargaining power 
of employees at a national level. The strength of collective voice depends on bargaining 
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structures, access to government and the militancy of the workforce. To draw up an 
international comparison we present data for a number of countries in the UK on the following 
three variables: 
I. Union density 
II. Bargaining coverage and wage setting 
III. Strike activity  
I. Union density 
Although institutional arrangements regarding the expression of collective voice differ between 
countries, union density (defined as net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary 
earners in employment), is seen as the best, and is the most commonly used, variable to assess 
the actual strength of trade unions.11 Unsurprisingly, it has been found in repeated studies to 
have a significant impact on the wage share, a point we explore more thoroughly in Chapter 2.  
The graph in Figure 2 shows how union density has changed in selected European countries 
since 1960.  
Figure 2: Union density, %
 
Source: OECD12  
Note: Union density is calculated as union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. 
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Germany and France, although remarkably lower than in Sweden and Denmark.13 The pattern 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Denmark
France
Germany
Sweden
United Kingdom
U
n
io
n
 d
e
n
s
it
y
 (
%
) 
13 
 
of declining union density is common across European countries, but the UK has experienced 
one of the strongest declines amongst them.14  
Union density in the UK decreased by 24.4% (from 49.9% in 1981 to 25.4% in 2013), 
a decline which is only surpassed by Austria (40.5%), Portugal (40.2%) and Ireland (25.2%)15 
and clearly exceeds that in Germany (18.3%) and France (14.4%).The general trend of the 
decline in union density is apparent across all the EU15 countries, with only Belgium, Finland 
and Spain (a country where trade unions were illegal until 1977) reporting a higher union 
density in the 2010s than in the 1970s.16  
 [BOX 2: The changing picture of industrial relations  
Labour unions bloomed in many countries across Europe between the 1950s and 1970s. 
In the UK, with a Fordism accumulation regime characterised by large, hierarchically 
organised firms, it was standard procedure for terms of employment to be negotiated 
between trade unions and employers’ organisations.17  
The picture today is markedly different. Several factors have contributed to the decline 
in union powers and union recruitment from the 1980s onwards. Most notably, the legal 
environment for trade unions became hostile in many countries, particularly the UK. 
This legislative hostility was characterised by a trend towards limiting legal protections 
available to individual workers, while at the same time overturning the tradition of trade 
union ‘immunities’ [See Box 4]. Additionally, the scope for legal industrial actions 
narrowed, while the internal procedures of trade unions became subject to burdensome 
regulation.18 
Alongside these changes, industrial relations have become increasingly characterised 
by ‘multi-skilling’ and flexible employment contracts, with negotiation of wages and 
terms of employment being conducted at lower levels of administration. Changes to 
incentive regimes have seen pay increasingly being linked to performance, reducing 
solidarity among workers, while the erosion of social security and universal labour 
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standards have simultaneously diminished solidarity at a societal level. On top of these 
factors, the rise of the service sector and concurrent decline of industries that 
traditionally had high levels of employee organisation has contributed to what has been 
the fastest national decline of union density out of all the European countries. These 
macroeconomic factors affecting bargaining power are covered in more detail in 
section 1.4. BOX END] 
 
Union density alone is not enough to describe the whole picture of industrial relations and the 
strength of the collective voice of workers. Complementing density with other variables such 
as union structure, bargaining levels and the militancy of workers gives a richer picture. 
 
II. Bargaining coverage and wage setting 
While union density measures the potential of union bargaining pressure, the actual 
effectiveness of unions in providing and defending minimum standards of income and 
employment is captured by looking at bargaining coverage. Bargaining coverage is defined as 
the number of employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of 
all wage and salary earners in employment who have the right to bargaining.19 Figure 3 shows 
changes in the levels of coverage for our selected countries.  
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Figure 3: Adjusted collective bargaining coverage, %20 
 
Source: Visser, J. (2013), ICTWSS.21  
 
The rate of collective bargaining coverage is close to union density in the UK and other Anglo-
Saxon countries such as Canada and the US. This reflects the fact that these countries have a 
highly decentralised structure, where bargaining takes place at the level of individual 
workplaces rather than applying to all employees across sectors. This means that, on the whole, 
benefits negotiated by union members apply directly to them.  
In France the setup is different: there, terms negotiated by unions apply to the wider 
workforce, albeit often on a loose basis. This is closer to the system in Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands, where collective bargaining is still primarily conducted at industry level 
between individual trade unions and employers' organisations. Here, many employers support 
the sector-wide application of agreements as it levels the playing field between the staff costs 
of firms.22  
As Figure 3 shows, bargaining coverage has seen the strongest decline in the UK, from 
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by 24%, 3% in Sweden and 2.5% in France. Notably, collective bargaining has stayed relatively 
stable in Denmark, at 80–85%, since the 1960s.23 
[BOX 3: Leading the race to the bottom of bargaining 
The UK was the world pioneer in the development of collective bargaining during in 
the early decades of the 20th century, with the development of trade unions and wage 
councils. Unfortunately the UK also led the attack on the frameworks in place to 
facilitate negotiations, with the series of reforms to trade union powers that took effect 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Prior to this, the state played a central role in 
institution building to facilitate sectoral bargaining structures, structures which in their 
early days were well regarded too by employers, who saw them as a means of avoiding 
undercutting by competitors.24 
The government-led reforms, however, saw the majority of employer federations break 
up or cease to be involved in agreements. As a result, today the picture is very different. 
The vast majority of the British workforce is no longer covered by collective bargaining 
arrangements, particularly those in the private sector. When bargaining does occur it 
happens at the level of the company or individual workplace, with firms setting their 
own terms and conditions.25  
In numbers: while coverage was as high as 70% in 1950, rising to 82% in 1979, it has 
since plummeted, to 25% today. Leading an international race to the bottom, the UK 
was until very recently the only country in the EU with collective bargaining coverage 
at a level below 50%.26 BOX END] 
 
Despite the fact that labour markets across the EU have been transformed by the same 
macroeconomic factors affecting other countries, such as technological change and the 
development of increasingly globalised and financialised economies, there is still a remarkable 
divergence in union structures across countries.  
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Table 1.1 below provides a fuller picture of the differences in the coordination of wage setting, 
in line with the cross-country differences in collective bargaining coverage. 
 
Table 1.1: Coordination of wage setting 
 
 Germany Denmark France Sweden UK 
1: Fragmented wage 
bargaining     1980–2011 
2: Mixed industry- and 
firm-level bargaining   1961–2011   
3: Industry-level 
bargaining 
1964–65, 
1968–77, 
1998–2001 1981–86  
1988–90, 
1983–84, 
1993–96 1961–74 
4: Extensive, regularised 
pattern setting 
1960–63, 
1966–67, 
1978–97, 
2002–11 
1987–
2011  
1985–87, 
1997–
2011 1975–79 
5: Centralised bargaining 
by peak association(s)  1960–80  
1960–83, 
1991–92  
 
Source: ICTWSS.27  
 
Here the coordination of wage setting has been ranked based on a number of variables.28 Rather 
than looking solely at the level where bargaining takes place, or at the degree of coordination, 
the table categorises the countries based on a set of expectations about which institutional 
features of wage setting arrangements are likely to generate more or less coordination.29 It 
therefore takes into account the fact that similar legal frameworks can result in different degrees 
of coordination.30  
As can be seen in the table, since 1980 the UK has been classified as a country with a 
fragmented wage bargaining regime, meaning that bargaining is largely confined to individual 
firms with a minimum degree of coordination. Mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with 
no or little pattern of bargaining and relatively weak elements of government coordination of 
the setting of basic pay rates (statutory minimum wage) or wage indexation, prevail in France 
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for most years. Denmark (1981–86) was characterised by industry-level bargaining with 
irregular and uncertain pattern setting and only moderate union concentration.  
The same level of wage setting coordination is assigned to the UK from 1966 to 1968 
and 1972 to 1974, although government arbitration and intervention played a stronger role than 
in Denmark. Extensive, regularised pattern setting coupled with a high degree of union 
concentration characterises German wage setting coordination in most years. In Sweden, the 
picture prior to 1983 was one of highly coordinated, centralised bargaining by peak 
associations, with or without government involvement.  
Changes over the recent decades follow distinct paths. Sweden and Denmark, for 
example, have less coordination now than between 1960 and 1980, but are more coordinated 
than they were in the late 1980s and 1990s, while in Germany a relative high level of 
coordination has been maintained. There has been no change in the entirely uncoordinated 
bargaining regime of the UK and most other Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1980s. 
Despite the fact that EU Member States are, as we have shown, quite diverse in terms 
of coordination structures, coordination of wage bargaining is, as expected, positively 
correlated with union density and bargaining coverage. In other words, when union density is 
low, both the coordination of wage negotiations and the level of their coverage are both also 
low. One obvious explanation for this is that bargaining is allowed to go uncoordinated only 
when there are low levels of unionisation and with limited bargaining coverage – as is the case 
in the UK. If the reverse was true and density and coverage were both high, coordination would 
be a more viable option.31 
 
III. Strike activity 
Another variable commonly used to measure the bargaining power of labour is strike activity, 
measured as the number of strikes and lockouts divided by the number of employees (in 
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hundreds of thousands of workers).32 Historically, the high level of unionisation in the first two 
to three decades after World War II was accompanied by a high level of union militancy in 
negotiations. In the following decades, however, the organisational base of the collective 
bargaining structure was weakened and consequently the power of the strike was severely 
reduced.33 Figure 4 shows strike activity for a selected set of countries. 
 
Figure 4: Strike activity in France, Sweden and the UK 
 
Source: ILO, OECD34 
Note: Strike activity is calculated as the number of strikes and lockouts divided by total civilian employment (in hundreds of 
thousands of workers).35  
 
What can be discerned quite clearly for the three countries plotted is that strikes have declined 
considerably across all, with the most significant decline being in the UK and France. As we’ve 
discussed, these countries are characterised by significantly different labour relations; for 
example the low absolute level of strikes in Sweden can be related to the ‘peace obligation’, 
according to which Swedish trade unions are only allowed to take industrial action during 
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negotiations of national collective agreements. However, as Sweden has a stronger mechanism 
to include political demands of unions, as well as having a high level of bargaining coverage 
and high union density, it can be argued that the decline in strikes there would not have had as 
strong an effect as it has had in the UK and France.  
Where both union density and collective bargaining coverage are low, such as in the 
UK, the bargaining position of workers strongly depends on their militancy and willingness to 
strike.36 
[BOX 4: Why has strike activity declined in the UK? 
Forming the basis of British trade union law, ‘immunities' from the normal application 
of the common law were first established at the end of the 19th century. These 
immunities mean that employees taking part in official union activities carried out as 
part of a trade dispute, such as strike action, are not held accountable for – are ‘immune’ 
from – financial losses incurred by their employer.  
Major pieces of legislation that made up the government’s industrial relations reform 
of the 1980s and 1990s saw these immunities become significantly constricted; one 
way in which this happened was through the bureaucratisation of official strike 
balloting processes.  
Despite the correlation between a reduction in strike activity and the legislative 
restrictions put on the rights of union members to strike, there are cases that complicate 
this trend. First, 2011 saw the highest rate of industrial action in the form of strike days 
since 1990, with 1.4 million working days being lost due to industrial action – a 280% 
increase from the previous year largely due to coordinated industrial action against 
proposed changes to public sector pension schemes.37 With 1.5 million employees 
taking part, 2011 saw the highest number of people involved in strikes since records 
began in the 1980s.  
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Another complication to the relationship between legislation and levels of industrial 
action is the potential for unintended consequences to arise. The drivers behind strike 
action involve a combination of political, economic and social factors that cannot 
necessarily be controlled for by regulation. Further levels of bureaucratisation placed 
on industrial action could for example lead to a diversification of activities, with trade 
unions opting to carry out actions outside of the legal framework.38 BOX END] 
 
1.4 Why the collective bargaining power of the workforce has weakened 
The restriction of bargaining rights and the deregulation of labour markets affect the bargaining 
power of the labour force via both direct and indirect channels. In Boxes 3, 4 and 5 we covered 
some of the direct changes that have taken place in the UK having the effect of restricting union 
powers. These structural changes can be summarised as the following: 
 Dismantling of union powers via legislative changes 
 Reduced role of the state in facilitating sectoral bargaining structures 
 Decline in employers regarding collective bargaining as beneficial to their 
sector 
 Less coordination of collective bargaining agreements 
 
There are, in addition, a number of connected factors that have reduced the bargaining power 
of the labour force somewhat more indirectly. These are changes that, when looking at the 
economy as a whole, affect the strength of the position in which employees stand when 
negotiating with their employers. Because of these factors, alongside the decrease in trade 
union density there has also been a decrease in influence even where there is collective 
bargaining coverage. We have identified five interrelated channels through which the 
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bargaining power of the workforce has been weakened in most countries across Europe, 
applying particularly in the UK: 
I. High unemployment and welfare state retrenchment, cutting the ‘fall-back’ 
options for workers  
II. Increased flexibility of firms in a global market  
III. Financialisation and shareholder power 
IV. Technological change 
V. The changing landscape of work  
 
I. High unemployment and welfare state retrenchment, cutting the ‘fall-
back’ options for workers  
High unemployment exercises a downward pressure on wages for the simple reason that with 
more people searching for work it is possible for employers to offer any new employee a lower 
wage – or use the threat of unemployment to reduce wages for existing employees.  
Furthermore, the deregulation of the labour market carried out between the 1970s and 
1990s, which involved changes to unemployment insurance benefits, employment protection 
policies, trade union powers, and payroll taxes, and the introduction of active labour market 
policies, reduced workers’ bargaining power significantly by increasing the power of the threat 
of dismissal.39 Other aspects of welfare state retrenchment, like reduced public spending in 
education and health, have the effect of decreasing the social wage of labour.  
 
II. Increased flexibility of firms in a global market  
While the fall-back options of the workforce have been restricted, having the effect of reducing 
the bargaining capacity of workers, the fall-back options of firm owners have increased. The 
broad trend of globalisation has brought with it increased options for firms to relocate to other 
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countries or register their status offshore. These represent a threat to workers’ bargaining 
power, as they all act to reduce the necessity to any given firm of maintaining a stable and 
steady workforce. 
Furthermore, the terrain on which trade unions must confront firms has changed 
dramatically over the last two decades as a result of changes in the way production is organised. 
Rather than concentrating activities under a single roof, and maintaining tight control over the 
whole production process, firms can now coordinate their activities in increasingly complex 
and dispersed ways, involving outsourcing, networked collaborations and market-based 
transactions.40 The increasing prominence of multinational companies that are structured in 
this way exerts further negative pressure on workers’ bargaining power, for instance through 
the increasing use of relocation threat to gain concessions in negotiations.41  
Many economists have pointed out that globalisation, by integrating the global markets 
for goods, services, capital and labour, reduces workers’ bargaining power through placing 
them in direct competition with workers from across the world. The impact of labour migration 
on bargaining power is, however, not clear, since migrant labour often acts as a complement to 
labour being performed locally, rather than a direct competitor: migrants performing necessary 
work that would otherwise be left undone, and so creating further employment opportunities 
for native workers.42  
 
III. Financialisation and shareholder power 
Over the past four decades, the financial sector has been extensively deregulated and has 
expanded enormously as a result. Financial markets, products and firms now play a much larger 
role in many areas, from pensions and social insurance, to homes and public infrastructure.  
Privatisation and the dominant drive to maximise value for shareholders at all costs 
have led firms to increasingly engage in financial activity focused on extracting the largest 
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possible short-term profit, as opposed to core operations that rely on the labour of a workforce. 
This increased role of financial activity and the rising prominence of financial institutions are 
trends that can be referred to collectively as ‘financialisation’.43  
Similarly to globalisation, financialisation has increased the ‘exit options’ for capital 
which can now be invested in real as well as financial assets.44 Multinational companies in 
particular are able to adapt to this new environment because, unlike firms located in a single 
state, they are able to shift their resources between different national jurisdictions to maximise 
financial benefit.45 With the status of the workforce as the backbone of firms and their 
productive activities giving way to an emergence of ‘investor identities’, the bargaining power 
of labour at the national level is reduced.46 Hostile takeovers of listed companies and firms 
adopting a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy both reduce prospects for workforces to agree on 
beneficial compromises. 
 
IV. Technological change 
A conventional argument put forward for explaining the declining bargaining power of labour 
is the effect of skill-biased technological change. The advancement of information and 
communication technology and the replacement of routine tasks by machines are held to have 
increased the demand for skilled labour, while reducing the demand for unskilled workers. 
Developments such as these might decrease workers’ bargaining power overall if they fall 
behind in the perceived race between education and technology; however, as discussed in Box 
6, the ultimate effect of these changes in relation to the other factors outlined remains 
ambiguous.  
[BOX 5: Technological change is not the only answer  
The precise reasons that the wage share has fallen are a matter of ongoing debate. 
Principal channels discussed in macroeconomic literature are technological change, 
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globalisation, financialisation and the decline in the bargaining power of labour market 
institutions.  
While all of these are likely to play some role, their relative contribution has been 
difficult to establish. There is increasing evidence, however, that the most popular 
explanation among mainstream economists – technological change combined with 
globalisation – cannot suffice to account fully for the shrinking of the wage share. 
Instead, there has been increasing attention more recently to the decline of labour 
market institutions and the role of financial activities as major drivers of changes in the 
wage share.47 
The dominant conclusion, as most prominently represented by the IMF and the 
European Commission, is that technological change is the primary determinant of 
falling wage shares, followed by globalisation.48 49 However, scholars have argued that 
a close examination of the reported findings reveals serious robustness issues regarding 
the effects of technology in particular.50 Indeed both the IMF and the European 
Commission report that the technology variables do not allow for the inclusion of other 
variables such as time trends, meaning that the measures of technology used do not 
properly capture its influence.  
An increasing number of other approaches emphasise instead the negative effects of 
globalisation, financialisation and the decline in government spending on the 
bargaining power of labour, and hence the wage share.51 Taking economic decisions to 
be inherently political, these approaches place power relations, oligopolistic markets, 
excess capacity and involuntary unemployment at the core of analysis, consistent with 
the main features of contemporary market economies. BOX END] 
 
V. The changing landscape of work  
Individual workers today find themselves in an increasingly isolated position in the economy. 
This is set to become more challenging in the future world of work, where the jobs gap is set 
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to grow, jobs may be displaced by technology and the nature of workplaces will place more 
responsibility on the individual.52  
Changes in the organisation of work have contributed to the rise of a multi-tier labour 
force, in which increasing numbers of employees are not covered by trade unions. This is the 
case across much of Europe, with the UK at the forefront of changes with a dramatic rise in 
non-standard contracts, replacing regular employee contracts with freelance positions. 
Younger workers are today starting their careers in a fundamentally different economic and 
political environment than previous generations, unions are a lesser-known component of 
working life and casual working contracts are the norm. 
While certain labour market changes have brought with them positive outcomes, such 
as the strong increase in the share of female union members in white-collar peak 
organisations,53 in Boxes 7 and 8 we explore two examples of how changes to the way we work 
have had a negative effect on the collective bargaining power of employees. 
[BOX 6: The rise of a self-employed workforce  
The structure of the labour market in the UK and elsewhere is undergoing significant 
changes. The proportion of employed people with full-time, permanent contracts is 
reducing as other working arrangements become increasingly prevalent. These ‘non-
standard’ contracts, such as temporary posts, part-time work and self-employment, 
accounted for a third of total employment in OECD countries in 2013.54  
Technological innovations made possible by an increasingly internet-based service 
industry have enabled leaner organisational designs, often through subcontracting work 
out to self-employed workers. In the UK the number of people in self-employment has 
grown by 40% since 2000, with a record one in seven people in the workforce now in 
self-employment.55 Within this growing component of the labour market there has, 
however, been an overall drop in earnings, with average income from self-employment 
down by 22% since 2009.56 Many self-employed workers struggle to survive on very 
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low incomes, with the poorest 20% of self-employed workers earning a quarter less 
than the poorest 20% of employees.57  
Indeed, as a trade-off for being one’s own boss, self-employed people tend to be paid 
less and have fewer benefits. Included in these figures are a significant number of 
workers falsely assuming self-employed status, often encouraged by employers to 
reduce their tax responsibility and so that workers can be engaged without being bound 
by employment rights and entitlements such as holiday pay, sick pay and pensions. 
Without coordinating structures between individual workers, collective bargaining 
coverage to address the pay and conditions of this group poses a significant conundrum. 
BOX END] 
[BOX 7: Effects of public sector cuts on collective bargaining 
Since 2010 the UK has been committed to a programme of spending cuts 
unprecedented in its recent history. The financial crisis hit the UK hardest amongst the 
G7 nations as a direct result of its exceptionally large financial system. The Labour 
government of the time allowed government spending to absorb the impact of the 
shock, with the result that the budget deficit rose to 11% of GDP by 2009, the highest 
of any EU country. It was this rise in the deficit (and government debt) that provided 
the new government with the pretext for its austerity package. 
At the centre of this has been a cap on public sector pay awards, with nominal increases 
in pay set at a limit of 1%. Even with inflation at historically low levels, this has 
represented a serious drag on the standards of living of public sector employees. At the 
same time, significant cuts to government departmental spending have resulted in the 
loss of 375,000 jobs between the start of 2010 and the end of 2014, and a forecast of a 
further 580,000 public sector job losses by the end of the planned austerity period, 
2018–19.58  
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Public sector trade union membership has, inevitably, fallen as a result, by 339,000 
between 2010 and 2014, just under figure for the total loss in employment. Collective 
bargaining, meanwhile, has also declined, falling from a peak of 72% of public sector 
workers covered by collective agreements in 2007, to 60.4% by 2014. This is, 
nonetheless, dramatically higher than in the private sector, where collective bargaining 
has dropped continuously for at least 20 years, and now stands at just 15.4%.59  
While the status of unions in the public sector has undoubtedly weakened, and 
collective bargaining has been undermined by the process of austerity, it is not clear 
what secondary impact this has had on private sector bargaining conditions. Average 
private sector pay has risen at a consistently higher level than public sector pay over 
the last year or more, although the average disguises significant variation by sector. 
This has closed the gap in average pay between public and private sectors; allowing for 
employers’ size (with larger employers tending to pay more), private sector workers 
have average wages 3.8% above the public sector average.60 Moreover, reversing three 
decades of continuous decline, private sector trade union membership has risen over 
the last three years, rising by 195,000 from 2010 to 2014. This rise is not as rapid as 
the increase in private sector jobs, and so union density overall has fallen. Nonetheless 
it reflects labour market conditions potentially more amenable to collective 
bargaining.61 BOX END] 
 
1.5 Evidencing the effect of union density on the wage share 
While bargaining takes place between employers and workers or their respective 
representatives, as we have discussed, there are many factors that influence the relative 
bargaining power of both parties. The strength of unions is shaped by their history, and depends 
on the economic, political and institutional environment their members face. Other, at first sight 
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seemingly unrelated, factors such as the extent of regulation on the product and the financial 
market can play a role, as well as long-term technological change.  
The relative size of the effect of those factors is therefore a question of empirical 
investigation. The next section outlines how the interplay of these factors is analysed in the 
economic literature both theoretically and empirically. 
[BOX 8: Income distribution is central to the performance of the economy 
Thomas Piketty’s groundbreaking Capital in the 21st Century, published in English in 
2014, compellingly suggested that current levels of inequality in wealth were 
approaching levels last seen in the late 19th century. With low rates of growth, more 
and more of any nation’s income would flow to the owners of capital, rather than the 
sellers of labour. 
In contrast to Piketty’s core argument, however, the research presented here suggests a 
different relationship. As the wage share has fallen, this has led to lower growth – not 
that lower growth has provoked a falling wage share of income. The mainstream 
literature has tended to focus on the ‘inevitability’ of a declining wage share given 
technological changes associated with a decline in the demand for less-skilled work, 
and the opening up of the world market through globalisation. The evidence for this 
view is, perhaps surprisingly, quite weak, with no clear relationship between identified 
technological changes and the wage share of national income.62 
Piketty extends this framework to argue for the importance of institutional changes in 
determining the distribution of income in any given economy, but his analysis 
deliberately does not look into the process by which that income is produced. The 
research presented here seeks to show that the question of income distribution is central 
to the performance of the economy, and that (in particular) the steady erosion of 
independent bargaining institutions for labour has resulted in both a more unequal 
distribution and worse economic performance overall. BOX END] 
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Measuring the negative impact of de-unionisation 
Many studies find a statistically and economically significant negative impact of de-
unionisation on the share of wages in national income. Table A.1 in Appendix 1 presents a 
summary of the findings in eight empirical studies that estimate this affect. Out of the eight 
studies included, five obtain a statistically significant effect of union density on the wage 
share.63  
The evidence summarised suggests that a 1 percentage-point point decrease in union 
density leads to a 0.019–0.379 percentage-point decrease in the wage share.  
With regards to theoretical literature, union density has been found to be associated with an 
increase in the real wage,64 especially in countries with a low level of bargaining coordination,65 
and with a decrease in personal income inequality – as proposed recently by the IMF.66 Another 
important angle put forward in the literature is that, in addition to these direct impacts, in a 
national and international context, stronger labour unions are likely to exercise political 
pressure in favour of redistributive policies, thereby decreasing income inequality through 
taxes and benefits.67  
More subtle, indirect impacts such as these pose a challenge to measuring the precise 
empirical effect of union density on the wage share. For example, for countries where collective 
bargaining coverage exceeds union membership, focusing solely on union density is likely to 
have underestimated the respective impact of unions on the wage share.68  
Table 1.2 shows the historical decline in union density for the EU15 countries 
(excluding Luxembourg) and the US in the second column. The third to fifth columns show 
the economic impact of this decline on the wage share.69 The decline in union density has 
considerable effects in most countries apart from Belgium and Spain. While union density 
barely declined in Belgium, the special case of Spain due to the Franco era was discussed 
above. 
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Table 1.2: Economic effects of union density on the wage share 
 
Country 
Historical change 
in union density 
Maximum effect 
(Kristal, 2010) 
Average effect 
Minimum effect 
(ILO, 2011) 
Austria -40.49 -15.35 -7.33 -0.77 
Belgium -1.33 -0.50 -0.24 -0.03 
Denmark -13.43 -5.09 -2.43 -0.26 
Finland -12.02 -4.56 -2.18 -0.23 
France -14.45 -5.48 -2.62 -0.27 
Germany -18.26 -6.92 -3.31 -0.35 
Greece -17.70 -6.71 -3.21 -0.34 
Ireland -25.16 -9.54 -4.56 -0.48 
Italy -13.57 -5.14 -2.46 -0.26 
Netherlands -24.06 -9.12 -4.36 -0.46 
Portugal -40.22 -15.24 -7.29 -0.76 
Spain -1.26 -0.48 -0.23 -0.02 
Sweden -16.13 -6.11 -2.92 -0.31 
UK -24.44 -9.26 -4.43 -0.46 
EU15 -15.75 -5.97 -2.85 -0.30 
USA -20.09 -7.61 -3.64 -0.38 
 
Notes: The change in union density is calculated as the difference between union density at its peak and the latest available 
value (2013 or 2012). All numbers are expressed in percentage points. The point estimators used for the calculation are the 
following: maximum effect (Kristal, 2010) = 0.379; mean = 0.181; minimum effect (ILO, 2011) = 0.019. 
 
Summary 
The data presented in this chapter has shown the dual trends of a significant decline in the share 
of national income going to wages and declining strength of collective voice which have 
characterised recent decades. We have covered how and why the bargaining power of 
employees has reduced significantly across Europe, with the UK leading the trend. The 
empirical evidence presented indicates that this decline in membership and efficacy is related 
to a declining labour share of income. In the next chapter we consider what effect this has on 
the functioning of the economy.  
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Chapter 2: Declining union density has slowed economic development 
Despite some signs of economic recovery since the recession, ordinary people 
are not yet sharing in the upturn. We present the evidence to show that without a strong 
collective voice for workers, the overall share of wages will be squeezed and the wheels 
of the economy will slow. 
Though in the UK the portion of income going to profits of companies has increased since the 
1980s, the growth rate of this national income itself, as measured in GDP, has slowed.70 In other 
words, despite the fact that company profits are accounting for an increasingly large slice of the 
economic pie, the pie itself is growing more slowly.  
In the following sections we look at what determines economic growth in the UK and other 
countries in Europe, and subsequently what impacts the interrelated trends of a declining wage share 
and declining union density have on economic activity.  
 
2.1 What determines economic growth? 
The decline in the wage share appeared at the same time as a weaker growth performance 
over the last three decades in the UK and other European countries, the US, Japan, and several major 
developing countries such as Turkey, Korea and Mexico.71  
In the UK the seemingly higher growth rates of 2000–07 appear, with hindsight, as something 
of an illusion: in the absence of strong productivity-oriented wage increases, it was rising household 
debt that fuelled consumption. This proved to be a fragile growth model that collapsed in the Great 
Recession. Average annual growth in the 2000s (2000–13) in the UK, including the years of the 
recession, is considerably low at 1.7%.72  
But are these two facts – of declining wage share and falling growth – related? The same 
economic facts can be open to different interpretation. Mainstream economic policy has emphasised 
the ‘supply side’ rather than the ‘demand side’ of the economy. Crucially, this has meant treating 
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wages predominantly as a component of costs to a business, reflecting the point of view of capital 
owners.  
 
As a result, mainstream economics is geared towards the assumption that when the wage share 
falls, and so the profit share increases, the economy will be boosted. Investment by firms will pick 
up, encouraged by greater profits, and (because labour costs will be, relatively, falling) exports will 
become more competitive and more will be sold overseas. This thinking guides policies promoting 
wage moderation in Britain and Europe.  
The basic facts of distribution and growth over the last few decades, however, pose a puzzle 
from the perspective of these mainstream policies. Profit shares have risen since the 1980s, but growth 
is lower. This directly contradicts both mainstream theory, and its application in policy. Measures to 
restore profitability have seemingly not also led to a restoration of growth – or as the Financial Times 
put it in reporting on research indicating the dilemma: ‘capital gobbles labour’s share, but victory is 
empty’. 73  
Wages play a dual role in the economy 
In the economic theory and related policies outlined above, which focus on the supply side of 
economic relations, wages are treated first and foremost as costs to a business. What follows is the 
assumption that wages must be moderated to ensure the share of income going to company profits 
remains high.  
But there is another side to this coin: the demand side, where wages are not merely an 
economic cost detracting from company profits, but the cause of demand in the economy through 
spending, and as such play an essential role in generating revenues. As is shown in Figure 5, rising 
wages are both a cost to employers and a potential source for new sales – they cut into profits and yet 
can boost them.74  
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Figure 5: The circular flow of income in the economy 
 
 
 
Demand therefore plays a central role in determining growth. Correspondingly, the distribution of 
national income between wages and profits has a crucial effect on demand levels.  
As two components of national income, the wage share and profit share are directly related: 
when the wage share is lower, profits (payments to those owning capital) are higher. The potential 
impacts changes to these shares have on levels of economic activity can be summarised as: 
1. Consumption is expected to decrease when the wage share decreases, since workers 
have a higher ‘marginal propensity to consume’ compared to those who own capital 
(see Box 09) 
2. Higher profitability, resulting from a lower wage share, is expected to stimulate private 
investment for a given level of aggregate demand 
3. Net exports (exports minus imports), for a given level of domestic and foreign demand, 
will fall with higher costs of labour per unit of output produced.75  
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[BOX 9: Marginal propensity to consume  
‘Marginal propensity to consume’ (MPC) is a technical term referring to the proportion of 
each additional £1 of income received by an individual that will be spent. It is lower when 
individuals save a lot (rather than consume) and higher for those individuals who save little. 
When the wage share decreases, meaning that the income share overall of those with a higher 
MPC falls, the overall consumption of a country decreases; if the reverse happens and the 
profit share is squeezed, consumption increases. BOX END] 
 
The total effect of the decrease in the wage share on aggregate demand depends therefore on the 
relative size of the reactions of these three factors (consumption, private investment and net exports) 
to changes in the income distribution. If the total effect is negative (a falling wage share produces 
falling demand), the demand regime is called ‘wage-led’. If it is positive, with a falling wage share 
leading to increased demand, the regime is ‘profit-led’.  
[BOX 10: How the total effect is calculated 
The empirical analysis used is based on econometric estimations of consumption, investment, 
exports and imports, with the findings verifying that a rise in the profit share leads to a decline 
in consumption.76 The total effect of a change in wage share on exports is a combination of 
the effect of labour costs on prices, the effect of general prices on export prices, and the effect 
of export prices on exports.77  
The effect of the wage share on GDP via the channel of international trade depends not only 
on the sensitivity of exports and imports to prices, but also on the degree of openness of the 
economy – in other words, on the share of exports and imports in national income – since a 
greater share of exports and imports in the whole economy implies that the economy must be 
more open. This means that in relatively small open economies, net exports may play a major 
role in determining the overall outcome, but the effect becomes much lower in relatively 
closed large economies. BOX END] 
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One size doesn’t fit all 
 
In theory, both scenarios are possible. Whether the negative effect of lower wages on consumption 
or the positive effect on investment and net exports is larger is an empirical question that will depend 
on how a particular economy is structured. The economy is more likely to be wage-led when 
consumption is very sensitive to the income distribution, when investment is not sensitive to profits 
(being driven more by demand), when domestic demand is a large part of total demand, or, finally, if 
net exports do not respond much to relative prices, including the price of labour.  
If, alternatively, the responsiveness of investment to profits is rather strong, and foreign trade 
is an important part of the economy (as it is the case in small open economies) and is very responsive 
to labour costs, then the economy is more likely to be profit-led. In a wage-led economy, a fall in the 
labour share would generate a decline in GDP. A higher wage share is required for growth. Pro-capital 
policies would generate more growth only if an economy is profit-led.  
The economic model described here offers a general theory of demand and growth, rather 
than a theory that works in only one kind of economy, those that are profit-led. Supply-side economic 
theory and the policies it supports have, however departed from the assumption that any particular 
economies are profit-led, and as such that all economies, taken together, must be profit-led. An 
example of this specific approach is the European Commission’s (EC) policy of wage moderation, 
designed and prescribed to all the countries in Europe despite the national differences.  
The EC explicitly argues that wage moderation (real wage growth below productivity growth) 
is the key to preserving growth and jobs in a competitive global economy. From this perspective, 
further deregulation in the labour markets would be regarded as a positive development, based on an 
implicit assumption that Europe as a whole is profit-led.78 Similarly, these policies have been 
exported to the developing world through the IMF and the World Bank, maintaining the assumption 
that the world taken as a whole must be profit-led.  
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Based on this assumption, pro-capital redistribution policies have been implemented simultaneously 
in many developed and developing countries in the post-1980s period. The result of this has been a 
global race to the bottom in the wage share, with countries pursuing policies which have forced each 
other into further declines in the share of national income going to wages. As changes in policy in 
one country can in turn impact on others, in determining whether a country is driven by wages or by 
profits, analysis of this global interaction is crucial: measuring, for example, how a change in the 
wage share in a country’s trade partner affects the import prices and foreign demand for that country.  
[BOX 11: Is an economy wage- or profit-led?  
Determining whether wages or profits are most important for growth requires empirical 
research. The share of wages in national income can matter for growth because spending by 
individuals from their wages is the main component of demand. If there is a squeeze in the 
wage share, their capacity to spend also declines. And if spending power is squeezed, firms, 
facing smaller markets, will quite rationally choose to hold back on investment and 
production. Growth overall is likely to fall. 
This can work the other way round. If the wage share is reduced, then the share for profits 
automatically rises. With more profits to spend on investment, and potentially falling wages 
making exports more competitive, growth could be boosted.  
Since either situation is possible in theory, empirical research is needed to settle the issue. 
Research has found that, for most European countries (including the UK), growth is ‘wage-
led’ and not ‘profit-led’.79 BOX END] 
 
2.2 Which economies are driven by wages, and which by profits? 
 
Building on the growing body of work that challenges the assumption that profits drive growth,80 this 
section first summarises the most recent estimates regarding the effects of the changes in the wage 
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share on growth for the UK as well as other European and G20 countries.81 The studies used go 
beyond the nation-state as the unit of analysis, discussing global effects, based on the responses of 
each country, to changes not only in domestic income distribution, but also to its trade partners’ wage 
share. 
We show the results for the estimates by Onaran and Obst (2015) in Table A.2 in Appendix 
3. What these results demonstrate is that, for all the European countries tested, domestic demand is 
led by wages. In other words, although there is some boost to investment from an increasing profit 
share, it is overwhelmed by the negative impact on consumption spending that a falling wage share 
produces.  
This picture shifts only slightly if we also take into account the international impacts of 
changes in domestic profit and wage share – the impact on net exports, as discussed above. The effects 
of net exports on national income are profit-led: a rising share of profits in general boosts net exports. 
In addition, due to the ‘multiplier effect’ (see Box 12), the impacts of changes in net exports, 
investment and consumption on national income will be magnified. 
[BOX 12: The multiplier effect  
The effect by which an increase or decrease in spending in one part of the economy has a 
‘ripple’ effect across the rest of the whole economy is known as the multiplier effect. Each £1 
spent is received by someone else, who then spends some part of their new earnings, meaning 
someone else receives more income, and spends some part of it, and so on until the ripples die 
out.  
The size of this multiplier effect – the multiplier – is determined by the marginal propensity 
to consume and import, as well as the response of investment to demand. A large multiplier 
means even a small initial change can have a significant overall effect. BOX END] 
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2.3 The UK is a wage-led economy 
 
Results from this econometric analysis indicate that the UK is a wage-led economy.82 A 1 percentage-
point increase in the profit share leads to a 0.13% decrease in private demand, after the multiplier 
effects.83  
This fall in demand is due to a decline in the share of consumption, which cannot be offset by 
a modest rise in net exports. This indicates that the rise in profitability (the rise of national income 
going to the profit share) does not in fact have a significant impact on investment, implying that 
investment spending in the UK is largely determined by companies’ expectations of future sales, 
rather than immediate profits. 
For the rest of Europe, it should come as no surprise that large economies like Germany, 
France and Italy are wage-led. The impact of falling wage share on net exports is not enough to 
overwhelm the fall in domestic spending that results. For smaller, open economies like Belgium and 
Denmark, this does not apply – although, interestingly, even smaller economies like Greece and the 
Netherlands are wage-led, even when taking the net export effect into account. These results are 
summarised in Table 2.1 under the ‘national result’ column. 
However, this is only a first step. We have briefly discussed how different economies can 
interact with each other – which the wage share of a trading partner, since it may well shift demand 
and prices in that partner, can feed back into another country. Once we make allowance for these 
additional international effects, the pattern shifts somewhat. Only Belgium and Denmark remain 
profit-led, while the EU as a whole is wage-led. See the second column of Table 2.1 for each country’s 
‘overall result’.  
This implies that policies to moderate wages in Europe as a whole are likely to have only 
moderate effects on foreign trade, but will have substantial effects on domestic demand, depressing 
growth. Second, if wages were to change simultaneously in all the EU countries, the net export 
position of each country would change little, because extra-EU trade is comparatively small. As a 
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result, when all the EU countries pursue ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies, promoting domestic wage 
reductions to improve international competitiveness, the actual effects on international 
competitiveness will be minor, and the domestic repression of demand will dominate the outcome.  
Table 2.1: Summary of results for individual countries 
 
Country National result Overall result 
Austria Profit-led Wage-led 
Belgium Profit-led Profit-led 
Denmark Profit-led Profit-led 
Finland Wage-led Wage-led 
France Wage-led Wage-led 
Germany Wage-led Wage-led 
Greece Wage-led Wage-led 
Ireland Profit-led Wage-led 
Italy Wage-led Wage-led 
Luxembourg Wage-led Wage-led 
Netherlands Wage-led Wage-led 
Portugal Wage-led Wage-led 
Spain Wage-led Wage-led 
UK Wage-led Wage-led 
EU15 - Wage-led 
Note: The ‘overall result’ takes account of the international effects that arise when countries interact with one another.84 
 
These estimates imply that the contraction in the UK, as well as in other wage-led countries, is much 
higher once these trading-partner effects are taken into account. In this race-to-the-bottom scenario, 
a 1 percentage-point simultaneous decrease in the wage share across Europe leads to a decline in the 
GDP of the UK of 0.20 percentage points, so the effect is now economically a lot more important. In 
this case the EU15 as a whole contracts by 0.30 percentage points.  
Dominant policy approaches that impose the same wage moderation policies in all countries, 
by contrast, must implicitly assume that Europe or the world as a whole, as well as the majority of 
individual countries, are profit-led. This is against the logic of our findings, given that the effects of 
a fall in the wage share on domestic consumption more than offsets the effects on investment. If there 
is not much trade outside an economic union, then the union as a whole cannot be profit-led. 
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To give a fuller picture, studies have shown that the US, Japan, and, in the developing world, Turkey 
and Korea are also wage-led.85 Overall, the results indicate that large and relatively closed economies 
are more likely to be wage-led. Canada and Australia in the developed world, and China, South 
Africa, Mexico, Argentina and India, are profit-led; as in small open economies, the net export effects 
are higher in all these countries.86  
[BOX 13: Trade unions: collective solutions to a collective action problem 
It may be rational for any individual firm to give its own workforce as small a share of the 
income it generates as possible, with a view to increasing its profits. This is because – without 
considering any negative effects on productivity – a simple estimation can be made that a cut 
to wages will leave more company income for profits. But if every firm, or even just a large 
number of firms, behaved like this, the economy would be pushed into a recession, as lower 
wages lead to lower spending.  
This is because even though a higher profit share at the firm level seems to be beneficial to 
individual capital owners, at the level of the whole economy a generalised fall in the wage 
share shrinks demand and means fewer goods and services are sold, however cheap it now is 
to produce them. This is the problem of the ‘realisation’ of profits. 
The rationale of an individual firm, contemplating wage restrictions to boost profits, cannot 
be generalised into the rationale of a whole country. Individual firms might prefer to suppress 
the wages of their own workers to increase profits, but they would prefer all other firms to 
give a pay rise so that there is someone to buy their goods.  
Furthermore, even in the profit-led countries, a regional fall in the wage share leads to an 
overall aggregate demand deficiency, and potentially produces an economic contraction in the 
individual profit-led country as well. A seemingly rational pro-capital strategy at the level of 
an individual firm or country is irrational and contractionary at the macro- or regional level.  
This is a classic collective action problem, in which choices that are rational for every 
individual or firm are irrational for society as a whole.  
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Solving collective action problems generally involve some form of collective intervention, for 
example in the form of direct government action. The regulation of fishing waters is a classic 
case, where, if left unchecked, individually rational behaviour leads to the damaging result of 
over-fishing.  
In the case of firms deciding the portion of profits to pass on to employees, collective 
intervention comes in the form of collective bargaining institutions such as trade unions. Trade 
unions bring together the voices of employees to bargain for adequate wages and working 
conditions, which in turn impacts demand in the economy overall. BOX END] 
 
2.4 What has been the impact of the fall in union density on growth? 
 
These findings allow us to estimate how the decline in unionisation has fed into a falling labour share, 
and therefore lower growth. As discussed in Chapter 1, research results from a number of studies 
indicate that the dramatic fall in the union density in the last three decades in the UK has led to a 9.3 
percentage-point lower labour share in GDP.  
The effects in the other EU15 countries are similarly significant, although the magnitudes are 
mostly lower due to a lower decline in the union density. Even according to the average effect of the 
estimations regarding the impact of union density, the deterioration in union power has led to a decline 
in the wage share of 4.4 percentage points in the UK.  
Table 2.2 reports the total estimated effect on GDP growth in a number of countries arising 
from their declining union densities over the last three decades.87  
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Table 2.2 Estimated impact of the fall in the union density on growth 
 
 Maximum effect  Average effect  Minimum effect 
Austria -0.108 -0.052 -0.005 
Belgium -0.469 -0.224 -0.023 
Denmark 0.320 0.153 0.016 
Finland -1.552 -0.742 -0.078 
France -1.301 -0.622 -0.065 
Germany -3.041 -1.454 -0.152 
Greece -6.837 -3.267 -0.343 
Ireland -0.497 -0.237 -0.025 
Italy -1.308 -0.625 -0.066 
Luxembourg -0.320 -0.153 -0.016 
Netherlands -1.601 -0.765 -0.080 
Portugal -5.778 -2.761 -0.290 
Spain -0.853 -0.408 -0.043 
Sweden -1.709 -0.817 -0.086 
United Kingdom -1.596 -0.763 -0.080 
EU15 GDP -1.814 -0.867 -0.091 
 
In the UK the fall in union density in the last three decades has reduced GDP by up to 1.6%. If we 
use the average of the estimated effects of the fall in union density, the loss in GDP is about 0.8%. 
Overall, the race to the bottom in labour’s share in the EU15 has resulted in GDP being reduced by 
up to 1.8%.  
Alternatively, if the union density in the UK were to recover to the level of 1981, at 49.9%, 
national income would be up to 1.6% higher, and the wage share increased by 9.3 percentage points 
to 76.6% of GDP. According to the average of the estimated effects of unionisation on the wage share, 
the impact of reversing the fall in union density would still generate 0.8% more national income, 
alongside a wage share increase to 71.7%. Even the lowest bound of the estimations indicates that a 
rise in union density has positive rather than negative impact on both growth and equality.  
 
[BOX 14: Moving away from growth as the sole measure of progress 
This chapter, and this report, has looked at the impact on standard economic outcomes of 
changes in the wage share and unionisation over the last few decades. We have concentrated 
especially on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for two reasons. First, because it is well-known, 
44 
 
widely used and is treated as a rough proxy for many other outcomes. Second, because at the 
heart of claims for a supply-side approach to economic policy over the last few decades has 
been the belief that this would boost growth – the so-called trickle down effect. The evidence 
presented here exposes this belief as, for most European countries (including the UK), 
significantly wrong. It is intended as a direct criticism of supply-side economic policy. 
However, the first point is more questionable. While growth and GDP are treated as a proxy 
for many other desirable outcomes, they are not in themselves desirable. Serious problems 
have emerged in recent decades with that claim: many economists have highlighted the issue 
of the decoupling of GDP rises from improvements in most people’s living standards, with 
rising inequality directly to blame.88 More of the increase in the economy’s output, as 
registered by GDP, seems to be falling into fewer hands. It is only when looking beyond the 
single measure of GDP that a clearer picture of the UK economy emerges. For example, while 
employment levels have recently been on the rise, according to ONS figures, job satisfaction 
levels, and hence the quality of roles being created, are declining. In 2010, 61% of people in 
work said they were mostly completely satisfied with their job, but the latest data shows that 
this has fallen to only 54%.89 
Moreover, GDP itself, if we think of it as a measure of scale of activity, hides deeper problems. 
At any given scale of economic activity, there are demands placed on available resources, 
including ‘public goods’ like a non-polluted atmosphere. As scale increases, registered 
through rising GDP, those demands rise – even with efficiency improvements. Where 
resources are constrained, this increasing scale becomes a problem. Compelling cases have 
been made that a focus on growth as a measure of progress is not compatible with long-term 
economic planning, most notably in its implications for climate change.90 Calls for alternative 
measures of economic progress have gained momentum.91  
GDP growth, then, cannot be taken as the sole viable indicator of progress. It comes attached 
to fundamental issues about the nature and purpose of the economy and its broader impact. 
The approach advocated here, although starting with a critique of those policies intended to 
boost GDP by squashing the wage share, should be seen as a starting point for a wider turn 
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towards more comprehensive measures of economic progress and, alongside them, an 
economic policy more directly focused on outcomes that are demanded by and give meaning 
to people’s lives. BOX END] 
 
Summary 
 
Our analysis has underlined the negative effects that inhibiting union activities has on the economy. 
The evidence presented indicates that the long-term deterioration in collective voice in the UK and 
elsewhere in Europe has been counter-productive in terms of macroeconomic growth. Legal 
restrictions on the ability of trade unions, where these bite sufficiently to reduce their bargaining 
capacity, are contrary to good economic policymaking where countries are in wage-led growth 
regimes, and where labour’s share of income has declined. Economic recovery and stable, equitable 
development needs a rise in the collective voice of labour.  
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Chapter 3: Implications for policy  
 
The extent of economic losses brought about by the reduction in collective bargaining 
in the UK is a crucial concern for policymakers. The benefits delivered by trade unions 
throughout their history remain not just relevant in the 21st century but essentia l for 
economic recovery and equality.  
Our evidence concludes that, as a wage-led economy, the UK’s prosperity requires a boost to 
the share of national income going to wages. The past four decades have shown that even in times of 
growing corporate profits, when left to their own devices employers share less with their workforce. 
It is the workforce, therefore, through the institutions that represent it, that plays an essential role in 
bargaining for its share of company, and indeed national, revenue, with a view not solely to 
maintaining, or indeed improving, living standards of individual workers, but also to enabling the 
functioning of the national economy as a whole.  
Responding to these findings, we have included considerations and recommendations for 
policy from seven supporting unions.  
 
An effective voice at work is vital 
John Hannett, General Secretary, Usdaw 
The findings of this report are extremely welcome, but should come as no surprise to anyone with an 
interest in labour relations. In all of my years as a trade unionist, the link between employee voice, 
fair pay and economic success has seemed to me an obvious one. This research demonstrates that link 
conclusively.  
A voice at work is vital – on that, there seems to be a consensus. However, what is frequently 
glossed over in the debate on employee engagement is exactly what form that voice should take. 
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It is, no doubt, tempting for employers to simply tick the box marked ‘staff engagement’ on 
their corporate social responsibility report, by sending out a survey, or holding a staff forum once a 
year. This achieves nothing, if their employees are still working unsocial hours in poor conditions, 
earning low wages and feeling that their concerns are not taken seriously by their employer. In such 
circumstances, it’s hard to see how an employer can expect a worker to put in discretionary effort and 
boost their productivity in any significant way. 
With the UK’s productivity levels struggling to improve following the recession, it is clear 
that there needs to be sustained growth in wages to promote demand and develop more productive 
businesses. Engaged workforces are vital to solving the productivity puzzle, and collective voice in 
the workplace through trade union representation is key to that engagement.  
There has been much talk of the Living Wage both pre- and post-election, and it is certainly 
true that the Living Wage must be promoted, to address the problems of low pay. However, there are 
wider issues to consider than just hourly pay rates. We need to look at the whole employment package, 
so that, for example, people are getting the hours they need to bring home a decent income. This can 
only be achieved by effective trade union representation.  
There need to be improvements to the statutory recognition procedure, to strengthen workers’ 
rights to collective bargaining. We also need stronger frameworks for information and consultation, 
and European Works Councils, which commit employers to more meaningful and timely consultation 
with worker representatives.  
One area where the quality of consultation is vital is in redundancy situations. There were 
many cases during the recession where unions worked with businesses to preserve jobs. Consultation 
in redundancy should be mandatory for all sizes of business, and the current loophole which excludes 
small workplaces which are part of large chains from the legal requirements needs to be addressed.  
Forward-thinking employers understand that decent pay and conditions are an investment in 
their business, not a burden. They also recognise the value of independent trade union representation 
in giving their workers a genuine voice in the workplace, problem-solving and managing change. 
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However, the animosity towards unions from the current government will doubtless have a ripple 
effect outwards, so we must continue to make a strong case for union representation and collective 
bargaining as part of a successful economy.  
 
A radical shift is needed 
Mike Clancy, General Secretary, Prospect 
The findings of the report confirm that the decline of collective bargaining and employee workplace 
voice in the UK has damaged macroeconomic performance. At a time when the Westminster 
government, employers and unions are commenting on wage share, productivity and skills 
development, the value of collective perspective and voice should not be in doubt. Yet it is.  
Prospect believes that the challenges of the macro economy will not be solved by a labour 
market of low regulation, self-interested corporate choice and ever-declining collective voice. The 
government is espousing an agenda of low tax, higher pay and reducing welfare bills. Well, the report 
shows one thing: left to their own devices, employers don't easily share with their employees when 
corporate value grows and the economy recovers. Wage depression is synonymous with having no 
one to bargain on your behalf. We knew this instinctively, but the report gives economic grounding 
to the opinion. 
There is much policy talk around union 'reform', industrial action thresholds and similar. Little 
of this relates to the principal mission of unions to work with employers to ensure productive, safe 
and engaged workplaces. Prospect wants to shift the political discussion to a higher level.  
The government is starting out on a familiar road on 'reform' but we want to talk about 
transformation – though not on unilaterally imposed terms, where only an employer view dominates. 
We need a new workplace vision where collective employee voice supported by statute 
becomes a UK norm. We will only address the issue of declining wage share, improve productivity 
and create good work by legitimising again the voice of employees. Any number of employer-
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sponsored engagement schemes are not enough. True voice is independent, influences key corporate 
decisions and can ensure that employees share in rising value. 
If the plethora of engagement practices and HR transformation programmes were working 
effectively the UK would not have a skills crisis, the government would not be telling employers they 
have to stop depending on welfare to subsidise wages, and we would not be lagging behind 
competitors on productivity. Something is plainly wrong and acceptance of the workplace norms of 
the last three decades is not the starting point for fixing it. 
This is radical and there will be strong opposition. Corporate Britain has become accustomed 
to deciding matters themselves and any proposal that employees should have the right to elect 
representatives who would then influence matters that have been previously reserved to the executive 
to decide unilaterally, will be dismissed as old fashioned or suitable only for others. This requires 
more than consultation on periodic events such as business transfers or redundancy. It is more than 
information and consultation. I am talking about codetermination, bargaining and agreement as a 
replacement for dispute and strike. Therefore it presents challenges to unions and employers alike.  
The next decade will decide whether the UK continues to head toward US levels of union 
membership, bargaining coverage and decline of employee voice (with the associated levels of 
inequality) or takes a different route that is more reflective of systems that endure in Europe. 
Policymakers need to wake up to this and realise that short-term choices, animated by particular 
events or ideology, will in the end create an environment where in the UK there is no effective 
counterparty to the untrammelled authority of employers. And look where that has got us so far. 
 
How to achieve sustainable and fair economic growth  
Janet Davies, General Secretary and Chief Executive, Royal College of Nursing 
This report makes a compelling argument that boosting the wage share is essential to sustainable 
economy recovery – it is clear that the falling share of wages in the overall income of our country has 
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resulted in lack of purchasing power for working people, growing inequality and a real sense of social 
injustice. Meanwhile, the UK is suffering from stalled productivity which represents a huge block to 
sustainable and fair economic growth.  
Finding solutions to these problems will depend on a better deal for working people, with the 
promise of secure work, and better pay. This means long-term action to reverse the trend towards a 
low-pay economy particularly in the care sector, capping excessive rewards at the top, and increasing 
the extent of collective bargaining and workplace participation.  
Effective trade unions are a vital element of reaching the goal of a stronger economy and a 
fairer society. Unions that can bargain for a rise in real wages will boost consumer spending and in 
turn kick-start productivity through increased innovation and investment.  
Increased earnings will undoubtedly increase purchasing power, yet without an associated rise 
in productivity, the benefit to the workplace or firm will be limited. Workplace productivity is 
inextricably linked to trust, and high levels of trust only come when employees are listened to and 
fully involved. This is particularly important in the workplaces where RCN members work. Health 
and social care are highly labour intensive, and real improvements in the workplace leading to 
improved patient care depend on highly engaged, motivated and well-paid staff. This means ensuring 
that health and social care staff have individual and collective voice, which enables them to contribute 
to decision making and their representatives to negotiate over terms and conditions. 
The RCN has a strong network of stewards and safety and learning representatives, making a 
significant contribution to bargaining and negotiating over such areas as terms and conditions, health 
and safety, and staff development. Day after day they contribute to workplace productivity by helping 
reduce staff turnover and improve the quality of care in the NHS and the independent sector.  
Engaged workforces are vital for improved productivity growth, and unions are central to 
making this happen.   
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Why government should promote collective bargaining 
Mark Dickinson, General Secretary, Nautilus International 
Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining are 
fundamental principles and rights at work. They are key tenets of democracy and essential means 
through which workers are able to balance bargaining power in employment relations and negotiate 
improvements in their working conditions. 
Economic research on unions proves that unionised workplaces have higher productivity than 
non-union workplaces. Studies suggest that this positive effect on productivity appears across all 
industries that maintain good labour–management relations. Through a union, employees have a 
means to participate in a dialogue with management, enabling them to collaboratively engage with 
their employer in labour–management partnerships to identify problems and processes that are 
wasteful, inefficient, or harmful to the employer’s operation. A unionised workforce can also reduce 
employee turnover and increase the retention of highly skilled and experienced employees, in turn 
encouraging increased investment in staff training. 
Thus, employee rights should not be viewed as costs or inefficiencies, as evidence points to 
the contrary. While collective agreements are designed to allow parties to negotiate and resolve 
issues, not to make market economies more or less efficient, it is important to emphasise that 
collective bargaining can be good for an employer’s bottom line and for the economic prospects of 
the country. 
Collective bargaining has remained a critically important mechanism for improving terms and 
conditions of employment and protecting workers, while at the same time facilitating stable and 
productive employment relations for employers.  
Negotiations between trade unions and employers can also facilitate commitment to improve 
work organisation, skills and productivity in return for employment security and a share in the gains. 
It is the process of collective bargaining that makes this exchange possible and the commitments 
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credible. The active involvement of trade unions and works councils in the change process is 
associated with improved firm performance. 
During the recent economic and financial crisis, in countries with highly coordinated 
collective bargaining, trade unions and employers were able to negotiate agreements that preserved 
jobs while at the same time facilitating the adjustment of enterprises. State support for short-time 
work and training, regulated through collective agreements, helped the social partners to mitigate the 
effects of the crisis on employment and earnings. 
In developing-country contexts, weak or missing institutions place limits on the potential 
contribution that trade unions and collective bargaining can make to narrowing wage gaps (including 
between men and women). In addition, the absence of collectively agreed rules governing 
employment relations can result in a large number of ‘unregulated’ workplace conflicts which can 
have a negative effect on efficiency. Rather than exacerbate informal employment, there is evidence 
that stronger trade union rights are associated with higher shares of formal employment. 
In my own industry, that of shipping, deregulation in the 1980s and the scrapping of the 
National Maritime Board has led to fragmentation in the industry and a regulatory vacuum in respect 
of, for example, training and recruitment (recognised by the employers’ organisations as well as the 
unions), which has led to the need for a ‘Seafarers’ Bill of Rights’ (the Maritime Labour Convention 
2006) which references the role of collective agreements positively throughout its pages. 
Governments need to play an active role in promoting collective bargaining, taking into 
account its voluntary nature. The focus of policymakers needs to be on how to improve the reach and 
effectiveness of collective bargaining, not on how to reduce its scope and coverage. There is also a 
need to strengthen trade unions and employers’ organisations in order to enhance the quality of 
collective bargaining outcomes in a global economy. 
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Productivity in the public sector – the forgotten success of union engagement? 
Dave Penman, General Secretary, FDA 
The private sector can represent productivity in pounds and pence with relative ease. The public sector 
sometimes struggles to demonstrate productivity success with such clarity. Despite this, the 
productivity successes in the public sector are nonetheless real. The key to those successes is the 
engagement with unions who have retained a strong presence in the public sector, regardless of the 
pressures and strains on union membership. 
Developing employment policies, structural reforms and workplace changes are areas of 
working life that are integral to maximising productivity. When unions are involved in these areas, 
and properly engaged, this demonstrably improves the effectiveness of the process and the 
participation of the staff involved. Without engaged and empowered staff, transformation takes 
longer, can be acrimonious and is less likely to result in the longer term rewards sought. 
Unions are experts in the world of work. We have aided employers in dealing with crises, 
adopting new technologies and taking on new challenges. Through the training that we provide to 
members, the skills developed by workplace representatives and the experience and breadth of 
workplace knowledge of officials, unions can provide invaluable assistance to employers across the 
economic spectrum. 
The only way to access these benefits is for employers, including the Government, to engage 
with unions. Finding out the obstacles to improved productivity isn’t the exclusive preserve of high-
billing consultants. The easiest way is to ask the people doing the work, and unions talk to their 
members, but more importantly they listen. 
Employers with foresight recognise this and prioritise union engagement. Contrary to media 
perception, unions want the workplaces in which they operate to succeed. In the public sector we 
work to ensure that the best possible public services are provided to the public. We highlight areas 
that threaten that objective: poor morale, recruitment and retention issues, ill-equipped offices, health 
and safety dangers, and a host of other threats. Working with an employer to resolve these issues is 
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in everyone’s interest and is what members rightly expect unions to do. Unfortunately for all 
concerned, it’s difficult to quantify and does not make the headlines. 
In the next decade the public sector and those that work in it, benefit from it and manage it 
face some daunting challenges; 'doing more with less' is a glib mantra but it has become the guiding 
principle throughout the public sector. We are starting to see the effects of regarding union 
engagement and staff involvement as optional extras. False economies are no economies at all. 
Sometimes, as the private sector knows well, you have to invest to save. Investing in technology is 
sensible and if done properly pays dividends to all. Investing in the workforce, however, achieves far 
more. Positive relations with unions can harness the skills, experience and knowledge of hundreds of 
thousands of public sector workers. The results could be genuinely revolutionary. 
The FDA believes in positive trade unionism. We believe that constructive and challenging 
engagement with employers brings out the best in staff relations and organisational productivity. As 
this report shows, the dead hand of pay restraint and anti-union rhetoric achieves nothing but division, 
stagnation and a moribund economy. We welcome this report and the challenges it poses to those 
whose focus is on rebuilding the UK economy and the UK workforce. 
 
Building a consensus  
Paul Moloney, Trade Union and Industrial Relations Manager, Society of Radiographers 
The findings of this report show that the agenda pursued by trade unions not only benefits our 
members but has far reaching impact across the economy as a whole. While this may not be news to 
trade unions, the findings of the report enable us to frame a different argument aimed at those who 
have not previously supported unions but instead have actively supported attempts to curtail our 
influence in the UK. This in turn offers the opportunity to begin to build a consensus around the 
positive economic benefits that higher trade union membership brings. 
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The report is also timely as its findings enable unions to contribute with more confidence to the debate 
on productivity. My own union, the Society of Radiographers, has two long-standing aims that will 
improve considerably the productivity of radiographers, raise their skill levels and ensure that as a 
profession we remain cost-effective for the NHS. We have argued that our members, where trained 
and competent, should be able to prescribe from a list of medicines and be permitted to make 
diagnoses from the scans they perform. Of course this benefits our members, who will see better 
career progression, but the benefits in improved patient care and value for money for the NHS are 
just as important: a classic win–win situation. 
The report shows that this win–win exists on a far wider scale across all sectors of the 
economy. It shows us that better employment law, improved training opportunities, better 
employment security and better pay are essential for delivering not just a fairer but also a more 
productive economy. This without doubt represents the real value of these findings. 
We may have failed so far as a movement to make the argument for a fairer economy. Often 
our arguments for the control or abolition of zero-hours contracts, for less draconian industrial action 
laws or even for increased spending on training, as examples, have been dismissed as being anti-
business and therefore anti-consumer, -passenger or -patient. This report shows that nothing could be 
further from the truth and that we can have a different debate with those who oppose us, arguing that 
while our policies will create a fairer economy, they will also create a more efficient economy. 
Those currently in government may believe that the way to prosperity is through de-skilling, 
deregulation and cheap labour and are prepared to attack anything that stands in the way of this, 
whether it be trade unions or the European Union, but this report shows that is only the way to 
prosperity for a few.  
Our task now is to take this report and debate it with those who may not be our natural allies 
but who do compete by being better rather than cheaper. There are many businesses who wish to 
work in this way and know it delivers sustainable long-term return for shareholders. But they have to 
look over their shoulder at those undercutting them and winning business by simply being cheaper. 
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For far too long UK policy has been to protect those who want to compete by undercutting pay, 
pensions and other conditions and not those who want to compete by investing in skills. This report 
shows this approach needs to be reversed and trade unions embraced if we want a better, more 
prosperous future.  
 
An active industrial strategy based on social partnership 
Roy Rickhuss, General Secretary, Community 
The economic impact of a collective workplace voice should benefit both the business and its 
employees. However, the new economy requires a government willing to help facilitate that collective 
voice if those benefits are to be achieved. I fear that the apparent hands-off, leave-it-to-the-market 
approach of this new Conservative government will not help facilitate such relationships but serve 
only to drive down standards. Government should help businesses to make long-term plans for 
growth. There is clear evidence from many other European countries that involving employees in 
long-term decision making can be a key factor in helping to increase productivity and developing a 
loyal workforce, committed to the future success of the business. 
In an increasingly competitive global market, I am convinced the only way for the UK to 
compete with the major emerging economies is for our businesses to be underpinned by a social 
partnership: a partnership which sees businesses invested in their communities and employees 
committed to helping the company do well. My own experience of negotiating with CEOs of 
multinational companies is that very often, it is the local relationships on the shop floor which are 
best equipped to meet a shared aspiration or tackle an industrial challenge.  
The UK government should bring together ministers, employers and trade unions to develop 
an active industrial strategy for each of UK's key sectors. A partnership at work fund should be 
established to support best practice in industrial relations and ensure that employer/employee 
relationships are fit for the 21st century. 
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For us to make these policy proposals a reality we need to build a coalition of support from all sides 
of industry. We need good employers, key decision makers and trade unions working together with 
the support of government. We also need to recognise that trade unions have a reputational problem. 
For every negative and often frenzied story about the abuse of trade union power there are hundreds 
of positive interventions made by trade unions in partnership with employers that never see the light 
of day. 
Many argue that the trade union movement isn't given a fair wind by the press and the right-
wing media in particular. While I don’t disagree with this analysis, I don’t believe this will change 
overnight and therefore we must find a way to cut through. We should be unashamedly proud of our 
successes, we should stand with good employers talking about the economic challenges we face, and 
above all we must make responsible trade unionism the default employee voice for these first decades 
of the 21st century. 
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Conclusion 
 
Decent wages, and the strengthening of the collective institutions that support them, are fundamental 
to the creation of the new path for the UK economy. The research presented in this paper reveals the 
labour movement and the workforce it represents to be in the backbone of economic prosperity, 
dispelling the predominant narrative of keeping labour costs down in the interests of competitiveness.  
Evidence has shown that most economies, including the UK – and, crucially, the global 
economy, treated as a whole – are wage-led rather than profit-led.92 This means that a decrease in the 
wage share of national income will tend to lower their growth. Despite this, the wage share has 
declined in 26 out of 30 high-income countries from 1980 or 1990 onwards.93  
This declining wage share reflects a political consensus in economic policymaking that is, 
despite the financial crisis and its consequences, still driven too much by the belief that supply-side 
measures to improve competitiveness and promote market efficiency will automatically lead to better 
social outcomes. The financial crisis and its consequences have, however, begun to open up questions 
on this consensus. The presence of rising inequality, in particular, resulting from supply-side policy 
over many years, has begun to attract critical attention. The IMF published evidence in 2015 showing 
that strong unions make economies more equal, and therefore more prosperous.94  
This paper adds another strand to the argument that the inequality/growth trade-off does not 
exist. We have laid out the evidence that the inequality of the share of income at a national level – in 
favour of the profits of firms over wages of workers – is a drag on economic activity. As we have 
seen, the picture for the UK is particularly damning, with the decline of collective bargaining in the 
last three decades having reduced GDP by up to 1.6%. In light of this, the belief that countries with 
decentralised collective bargaining systems and weak trade unions gain an economic advantage can 
be dismissed.  
Unions have been a critical force in building trust and solidarity across workforces, 
establishing strong networks and a collective narrative in society, reducing inequality and wage 
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dispersion in organisations and whole sectors, and achieving workplace democracy. To reverse the 
diminishing of the share of income going to wages that has been the trend for four decades, labour 
institutions and the economy must be reconnected in a rightfully symbiotic relationship.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: The effect of union density on the wage share 
Table A.1: A review of empirical literature  
 
Authors, year Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables and signs 
(if significant) 
Estimation 
method 
Sample Marginal 
effect of 
union 
density 
EC 2007 Wage share Union density,  
minimum wage (+), K/L (+), 
ICT, PMR, trade openness (-), 
BRR (-), EPL (-), tax wedge (-), 
ALMP 
OLS, FE, 
trend (not 
reported) 
13 OECD 
countries, 
1983–2002,  
Insign. 
IMF 2007 Wage share Union density, 
Import (+) and export prices, K/L 
(+), immigration, offshoring, 
ICT, tax wedge, BRR 
OLS, FE 18 
countries, 
1982–2002 
Insign. 
Stockhammer 
2009 
Wage share Union density (+), 
ICT, K/L, trade openness (-), tax 
wedge, product market 
regulation, EPL, terms of trade, 
BRR, investment ratio, financial 
globalisation (-), long-term real 
interest rate  
1. OLS, 5-year 
averages, FE 
and double 
FE; 
2. OLS, 
annual data, 
FD 
15 OECD 
countries, 
198–2003 
Min: 
0.13*** 
Max: 0.2** 
Kristal 2010 Wage share Union density, strikes (+), 
political orientation, productivity 
(-), social expenditure (-), 
manufactured imports (non-
OECD countries) to GDP (-), 
unemployment, immigration (-), 
inward FDI 
ECM, FE 16 OECD 
countries, 
1961–2005 
Short-term: 
0.379** 
Long-term:  
insign. 
ILO 2011 Wage share Union density(+), 
K/L, trade openness, BRR, tax 
wedge, EPL, young and old 
workers to labour force, GDP per 
capita, exchange rate, long-term 
real interest rate, financial 
globalisation 
GLS, FE 
(period) 
16 
countries, 
1981–2005 
Min: 
0.019*** 
Max: 
0.083*** 
Stockhammer 
2013 
Wage share 
(private 
Sector) 
Union density (+), 
ICT, K/L, trade openness (-), 
terms of trade (-), government 
consumption (+), growth rate, 
financial globalisation (-) 
1. OLS, FE; 
FD;5-year 
averages 
2. GMM 
28 OECD 
countries, 
1980–2000 
Min: 
0.096* 
Max: 
0.281*** 
Dünhaupt 201395 Wage share Union density, strikes, 
trade openness (-), inward (-) and 
outward FDI, import prices (-), 
unemployment (-), public sector 
(+), dividend and interest 
payment (-)  
1.OLS, double 
FE; FD  
2. FGLS, 
double FE 
13 OECD 
countries  
1986–2007 
Insign. 
Kohler, 
Guschanski, 
Stockhammer 
201596 
Wage share Union density(+), 
unemployment, EPL, GRR, trade 
openness, ICT, financial 
openness index, stock market 
turnover ratio, household debt 
1. OLS, FE;  
2. FD 
14 OECD 
countries  
1989–2011 
Min: 
0.119** 
Max: 
0.327*** 
61 
 
Notes: K/L = capital labour ratio. Trade openness calculated as exports plus imports divided by GDP. 
BRR = benefit replacement ratio. EPL = employment protection legislation. The tax wedge is the 
wedge between the labour cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the 
employee. ALMP = expenditure on active labour market policies. Immigration = foreign labour force 
as a ratio of total labour force. Offshoring = imports of intermediate inputs to gross output. ICT = 
stock of information and communication capital to total capital stock. Financial globalisation = 
foreign assets plus liabilities to GDP. Political orientation = dummy variable for left wing 
governments. FDI = foreign direct Investment. Public sector = public sector value added to total value 
added. Dividend and interest payment = dividend and interest payment of non-financial corporations 
to capital stock. OLS = ordinary least squares. FE = fixed effects. FD = first differences. ECM = 
error-correction model. (F)GLS = (feasible) generalised least squares. GMM = generalised method 
of moments. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.    
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Appendix 2: A review of contesting theoretical approaches  
 
Different economic schools of thought developed distinct starting points for their analysis of 
functional income distribution. The neoclassical approach, which also forms the basis for the New 
Keynesian analysis, starts with a production function with two factors: capital and labour. The relative 
income shares of labour and capital are determined by technology.97 Hence, the focus on technological 
change which characterises many studies in the mainstream economic tradition derives directly from 
their theoretical approach.  
There are two critical assumptions in this framework: perfectly competitive markets and full-
capacity utilisation. As soon as the assumption of perfect competition is dropped, i.e. if firms and 
workers act in oligopolistic markets as is mostly the case, relative bargaining power is influenced by 
the price-setting power (mark-up power) of firms. There is a substantial literature in the New 
Keynesian tradition that derives from this.98 
Consistent with the nature of modern capitalist economies, the relaxation of the assumption 
of full-capacity utilisation, i.e. the acceptance that capitalist economies are marked by presence of 
excess capacity and involuntary unemployment, gave birth to Keynesian macroeconomics, which 
emphasise the role of effective demand in determining output, income and employment. 
Consequently, functional income distribution is governed by demand, i.e. consumption of workers 
and capitalists and, more importantly, by the propensity to invest, which is driven by aggregate 
demand and business expectations, i.e. the animal spirits of the private investors.99 
The Political Economy approach sees distribution as a result of power relations. Technology 
might affect bargaining relations but technological change itself is an endogenous outcome of 
conflicts in the labour process. Wages are negotiated between employers and employees and are 
therefore subject to social norms and relative bargaining power. Consequently, scholars in this 
tradition have offered a more thorough analysis of the determinants of bargaining power. Marxist 
economists emphasise the sphere of production as the source of surplus and the core determinant of 
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income distribution. Economists working in a post-Keynesian or Kaleckian tradition start directly 
from the assumption of oligopolistic markets and focus on the sphere of circulation. They take on 
board both imperfect competition and the presence of excess capacity and involuntary unemployment 
as crucial factors in analysing distribution, and emphasise the degree of monopoly in a market, which 
is determined by the degree of competition between firms, as well as union power and, in a more 
recent interpretation of the literature by the strength of the financial sector. 
 Although the New Keynesian and the Political Economy approaches to income distribution 
start from different assumptions, both arrive at a bargaining framework to analyse distribution of 
income, at least in the more recent studies in the New Keynesian tradition. The effects of globalisation 
and financialisation have also been integrated in empirical studies in both traditions, even though the 
latter aspect features less prominently in the mainstream New Keynesian analysis.  
Appendix 3: The effect of the profit share on national income 
Table A.2 summarises the effects of a 1 percentage-point increase in the profit share on 
consumption, investment and net exports, based on the estimations by Onaran and Obst.100
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Table A.2 Summary of the effects of a 1 percentage-point increase in the profit share at the 
national and European level 
  
The effect of a 1 percentage-point increase in the profit share in only one country on:  
The effect of 
a 
simultaneous 
1 
percentage-
point 
increase in 
the profit 
share on % 
change in 
aggregate 
demand  
C/Y I/Y X/Y M/Y NX/Y 
Private 
excess  
demand / 
Y Multiplier 
% 
Change 
in  
aggregate 
demand 
(F*G) 
  A B C D  E (C-D) F (A+B+E) G H I 
A -0.277 0.000 0.234 -0.161 0.396 0.119 1.039 0.124 -0.185 
B -0.151 0.206 0.000 -0.053 0.053 0.108 0.740 0.080 0.009 
DK -0.155 0.169 0.185 0.000 0.185 0.198 1.246 0.247 0.107 
FIN -0.243 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.074 -0.169 1.316 -0.222 -0.304 
F -0.324 0.101 0.062 -0.078 0.140 -0.083 1.559 -0.129 -0.228 
D -0.397 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049 -0.348 1.136 -0.395 -0.442 
GR -0.564 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.099 -0.465 1.984 -0.923 -1.027 
IRL -0.229 0.161 0.000 -0.074 0.074 0.006 0.863 0.005 -0.066 
I -0.410 0.156 0.050 -0.087 0.137 -0.117 1.451 -0.170 -0.238 
L -0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.153 0.535 -0.082 -0.128 
NL -0.322 0.078 0.000 -0.069 0.069 -0.175 0.820 -0.144 -0.191 
P -0.402 0.000 0.000 -0.182 0.182 -0.219 1.546 -0.339 -0.477 
E -0.410 0.088 0.044 -0.068 0.113 -0.210 2.147 -0.450 -0.544 
S -0.388 0.128 0.057 -0.056 0.113 -0.147 1.058 -0.155 -0.271 
UK -0.252 0.000 0.074 -0.066 0.140 -0.112 1.129 -0.126 -0.195 
EU15 GDP         -0.298* 
 
Source: Onaran and Obst (2015)101 
Notes: A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = 
Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, L = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = 
Sweden, UK = United Kingdom 
* The country-specific growth rates from column I are multiplied by the weighted share of each 
country in EU15 GDP. 
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